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In computerized technology, artificial speech is becoming increasingly important, and is
already used in ATMs, online gaming and healthcare contexts. However, today’s artificial
speech typically sounds monotonous, a main reason for this being the lack of meaningful
prosody. One particularly important function of prosody is to convey different emotions.
This is because successful encoding and decoding of emotions is vital for effective social
cognition, which is increasingly recognized in human–computer interaction contexts.
Current attempts to artificially synthesize emotional prosody aremuch improved relative to
early attempts, but there remainsmuchwork to be done due tomethodological problems,
lack of agreed acoustic correlates, and lack of theoretical grounding. If the addition of
synthetic emotional prosody is not of sufficient quality, it may risk alienating users instead
of enhancing their experience. So the value of embedding emotion cues in artificial speech
may ultimately depend on the quality of the synthetic emotional prosody. However, early
evidence on reactions to synthesized non-verbal cues in the facial modality bodes well.
Attempts to implement the recognition of emotional prosody into artificial applications
and interfaces have perhaps been met with greater success, but the ultimate test of
synthetic emotional prosody will be to critically compare how people react to synthetic
emotional prosody vs. natural emotional prosody, at the behavioral, socio-cognitive and
neural levels.
Keywords: social cognition, emotion, prosody, artificial speech, human–computer interaction
INTRODUCTION
One of the great challenges faced by the human mind is the need to comprehend the mental state
of other people. Fortunately, this task is made easier by non-verbal cues in the form of emotional
prosody, and it is these such cues that people use to manage their social relationships (Mehu
and Scherer, 2012; Tschacher et al., 2014). Prosody refers to acoustic properties beyond those of
consonants and vowels, including variables such as pitch, duration, intensity, voice quality, and
spectral properties (Ross, 2010). By manipulating prosody, we can alter our tone of voice, and
hence change the emotion conveyed. Human–computer interaction concerns how people interact
with computerized technology (Boehm-Davis, 2008), and amongst the range of applications and
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interfaces (HCI-AI) that exist, an ever increasing proportion
incorporate artificial speech (Drahota et al., 2008; Robinson and
el Kaliouby, 2009). However, a likely obstacle to wide acceptance
of today’s artificial speech is its lack of the “human touch,” because
it sounds monotonous, and does not change interactively with
the user. Whilst an increasing number of HCI-AI now also
incorporate rudimentary speech recognition (Putze and Schultz,
2014; Schwenker et al., 2015), they too often lack the “human
touch” because they cannot distinguish between the words that
are spoken and the way in which they are spoken. In the
following mini-review we consider the possible advantages and
disadvantages of incorporating expressive speech with emotional
prosody into HCI-AI. We examine what has been achieved so far,
and the necessary work that remains.
WHEN IS ARTIFICIAL EMOTIONAL
PROSODY BENEFICIAL FOR USERS?
It has been known for some time that the ability to recognize
and express emotions plays a key role in human communication,
and more recently, its importance has been recognized in
HCI. In research on HCI this is reflected in the wish to
achieve more natural interaction (Schröder, 2001), dubbed
the “Realism Maximization Theory” (Edlund et al., 2008)
Naturally, realism maximization cannot be achieved without
incorporating emotional prosody intoHCI technology to enhance
the communication of intendedmessages, just as these cues do for
natural speech (Esposito et al., 2015). Whilst human and artificial
voices can sometimes be distinguished (Belizaire et al., 2007;
Gaucher et al., 2013), available evidence suggests that whether
synthesized or recorded, a happy voice still makes content seem
happier, and a sad voice still makes content seem less happy (Nass
et al., 2001).
The key question is, has the aim of enhancing HCI by
incorporating synthesized emotional prosody been achieved?
Engagement with HCI continues to increase because it is believed
that the experience is acceptable and enjoyable, and that HCI-AI
can serve as socially intelligent interaction partners that can
provide assistance to people (Gorostiza and Salichs, 2011; Wood
et al., 2013). But is this really the case? One forum in which
HCI-AI appears to be benefitting from incorporating emotional
prosody is in the healthcare system. Here, communications to and
from patients through emotional channels is of vital importance,
and advocates argue that these technologies make HCI-AI
more human-like, meaning that users can then rely on well-
learned social interaction skills tomake the interactions smoother
(Berry et al., 2005). Augmentative and alternative communication
devices for those unable to produce their own speech (e.g., because
of neurodegenerative disease) are a particularly relevant example
of the benefits of adding emotional prosody to HCI-AI. As
illustrated in the case of the eminent StephenHawking, with these
devices users can spell out or select any word they choose, but
only have recourse to punctuation to influence the way those
words are spoken. When listening to users of these devices other
than Hawking, listeners may incorrectly assume that they are
emotionally as well as speech-impaired, and socially inept (Pullin
and Cook, 2013). This is unsatisfactory given the evidence that
without the full embodiment of emotional expression present
in interpersonal interactions, communication, coordination and
performance can suffer immensely (Gerdes et al., 2014). Other
applications of expressive speech are covered elsewhere in this
review, but for further examples of areas of application which
appear promising at this stage, we direct the reader to consider
narratives in gaming arenas, voice conversion for the purposes
of, and the use of human–human interaction analyses to aid
our understanding of social dynamics (Burkhardt and Stegmann,
2009; Schröder, 2009; Vinciarelli et al., 2009; Devillers and
Campbell, 2011; Creer et al., 2013; Esposito et al., 2015).
Compared to the expression of emotional prosody, there
appears to be greater evidence of success in the incorporation
of prosodic emotion recognition into HCI-AI. The driving
force here has been the need for these applications to make
appropriate reactions in interactive processes, for which the
capacity to process human speech signals through emotion
recognition is required (Wang et al., 2014;Mavridis, 2015).Whilst
many potential applications are being developed (Burkhardt and
Campbell, 2014). In the healthcare context, people with autism
can sometimes prefer to communicate with computers rather
than humans, because it feels more predictable to them and
affords greater control over an otherwise chaotic social world
(Moore et al., 2000). Sociable HCI-AI incorporating microphones
to record emotional prosody may be a good approach to
helping social interaction skills (Kim et al., 2013). In this arena,
affect sensing and recognition technologies can help increase
self-awareness, and provide novel means of self-monitoring (el
Kaliouby et al., 2006). Another possible healthcare application is
to improve diagnoses of flat affect in patients with depression and
schizophrenia, which currently rely on psychiatrists’ subjective
judgment (Fragopanagos and Taylor, 2005). Similarly, there
is evidence of the promise of automated analyses of vocal
markers for Parkinson’s disease (Tsanas et al., 2012). HCI-AI
sensitive to emotional prosody also holds promise in the
learning environment, e.g., in automatic tutoring applications.
Such emotion-sensitive automatic tutors have the capacity to
interactively adjust teaching content and the speed at which it is
delivered, based on whether a user finds it boring and dreary,
or exciting and thrilling (Litman and Forbes-Riley, 2006). Whilst
such systems were once feared not to be as effective as one-to-
one human tutoring, the addition of the capacity to recognize
emotional signals, has narrowed the gap (Mao and Li, 2010).
WHEN IS IT NOT BENEFICIAL?
Unfortunately, the use of artificial speech technology that does
not deliver its promise in terms of improved interaction will
only frustrate users (Laukka et al., 2011). At the theoretical level,
Mori’s “uncanny valley” theory (Edlund et al., 2008) suggests that
as artificial HCI characters approach realistic visual similarity
to humans, at a certain point they stop being likeable and
instead appear eerie, frightening, repulsive—“uncanny” (Mori,
1970). What if the same “uncanny” effect were true for auditory
dimensions of HCI-AI, and how might such an auditory effect
compromise user acceptance? Certainly disembodied emotional
voices presented in isolation are not always received well. Here
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users may struggle to interpret emotional cues conveyed through
the voice, because unlike embodied HCI-AI voices that possess
contextual cues to allow users to better determine emotional
intentions, disembodied voices allow toomuch ambiguity (Barker
et al., 2013). On a practical level, some question how feasible the
development of human-like artificial prosody truly is (Edlund
et al., 2008). In particular, there is no singular means of
creating artificial prosody, and each specific means has its own
imperfections (Esposito and Esposito, 2012). Ultimately, however,
the issue boils down to the question of whether and to what
extent artificial emotion cues are contextually appropriate, which
in turn will be contingent on our level of scientific understanding
of emotional expressions.
Questions have also arisen as to the success withwhich artificial
emotional prosody has usefully been incorporated into HCI-AI,
in some of the very same areas that heralded its promise. To
take the example of ATM’s with emotional prosody, compared
to human tellers or traditional ATMs without this capacity, it
could be argued that it is a rather unusual experience to talk to
a machine (Fischer, 2010). This might be due, in part, to the
awkwardness of knowing that no human is there, and it might
also be difficult to imagine that for ordinary use, people want to
have an artificial agent openly express anger or displeasure to a
user. Or it might simply reflect that this technology is relatively
new, and that consumers and users need time to get used to
such well-intentioned amplification of emotional communication
through prosody. A second exemplar concern is the healthcare
applications for those unable to produce their own speech. Here
there is no vocal individuality, i.e., the systems are not designed to
imitate a specific speaker’s voice (Wendemuth and Biundo, 2011).
This identity mismatch may impact use and adoption of these
devices and further perpetuate the divide between the user and
the device (Mills et al., 2014).
WHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE?
If it were possible to further improve the quality of artificial speech
with emotional prosody, it would have significant consequences
for those involved in creating HCI-AI (Brenton et al., 2005).
As computerized technology becomes an ever greater fixture
at home and at work, our future interactions with it will need
to become even more sophisticated (Wendemuth and Biundo,
2011; Honold et al., 2014). Some time ago, it was recommended
that artificial speech synthesis technology should not only have
the ability to control prosody based on meaning, but also the
capability to control individual speaking style (another form of
prosody), choosing application-oriented speaking styles, and be
able to add emotion (Furui, 1995). Yet, as we have seen, there
remains much work to be done (Burkhardt and Stegmann, 2009).
Although problematic, delivery to date of HCI-AI able to crudely
interact with people, attempt to sense emotional prosody, and try
to produce suitable responses, has produced great expectations for
the future (Esposito and Esposito, 2012).
Social HCI-AI need to follow behaviors similar to humans: they
interact and communicatewith humans by following a set of social
rules (Pullin and Cook, 2013). Additional work on the social skills
and responsivity with which HCI-AI are programmed will likely
increase the empathy and acceptance level of interactions further
(Leite et al., 2013). From the human interface point of view, it has
long been recognized that HCI-AI should be able to automatically
acquire new knowledge about the thinking process of individual
users, automatically correct user errors, and understand user
intentions by accepting rough instructions and inferring details
(Furui, 1995). Ultimately, the hope for the future is that HCI-AI
could extract the prosodic cues from a user’s speech, capitalize on
the information to inform predictive models of likely emotions
(Litman and Forbes-Riley, 2006), and amend their own displays
and actions accordingly. Such an aim is not without its challenges
though. For example, much work is ongoing at present into how
a HCI-AI might best transcribe and annotate a user’s prosodic
emotion cues in order to reliably label and act appropriately on
the likely emotional state conveyed thus (Siegert et al., 2013, 2014).
Beyond being responsive and interactive, HCI-AI with emotional
prosody also requires further work on the modification of their
implementation depending on context. We may adopt a different
palette of tones of voice with different people, depending on our
relationship to them or the social context (Pullin andCook, 2013).
Whilst there may be problems with current technology
(Schröder, 2009), we believe that healthcare applications of
HCI-AI with artificial emotional prosody still hold the potential
to make a genuine difference to peoples’ lives in the future.
HCI-AI that express emotion cues could especially enhance
the ability to make sense of and communicate with others
in people with difficulty understanding, communicating and
regulating their emotion systems, such as autism, and the affective
disorders (Robinson and el Kaliouby, 2009). Personalized voices
may also be possible for those who rely on alternative or
augmented communication devices, by mapping existing text
to speech corpora onto a voice personalized to the residual
vocal characteristics of a specific user (Creer et al., 2013;
Mills et al., 2014). Whilst future assistive HCI-AI agents with
emotional prosody might be expected to benefit users of all ages,
the development of socially intelligent assistive technology has
promise for increasing quality of life for older adults in particular,
in the form of reminder systems, telecommunication systems,
surveillance systems, and the ability to provide social interaction
and complete daily household tasks (Beer et al., 2015).
PROBLEMS STILL REQUIRING
A SOLUTION
As alluded to above, current technology for synthesizing effective
emotional prosody is still rudimentary. Yet if we were able to
improve its quality, it would have far-reaching consequences for
the success of HCI-AI attempting to capitalize on its potential
(Brenton et al., 2005). One source of the slow progress toward
synthesizing good quality artificial emotional prosody is the
difficulty of identifying clear acoustic correlates for discrete
emotions (Banse and Scherer, 1996; Schröder, 2009). This
problem is compounded by the fact that most work on natural
emotional prosody has taken its measurements from recordings
of actors trying to portray various emotional tones of voice.
But it is questionable whether actors’ portrayals authentically
represent the characteristics of speech used by ordinary people
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when they spontaneously experience emotions (Douglas-Cowie
et al., 2007; Esposito and Esposito, 2012). A further difficulty is
that, because each acoustic dimension can be measured in many
different ways (Xu, 2011), there are actually many more possible
acoustic measurements than can be realistically exhausted in
elucidating acoustic correlates. However, recent work on defining
emotions through mathematical modeling holds promise in
tackling the current lack of consistent acoustic correlates in human
communications (Hartmann et al., 2012; Xu, 2015).
A second problem with generating good quality artificial
emotional prosody is that there is still an unsolved need to
directly control specific aspects of artificial prosodic emotion cues
based on theoretical motivations, as attempted in dimensional
approaches to the measurement of emotions (Burkhardt and
Stegmann, 2009; Mauss and Robinson, 2009; Verma and Tiwary,
2014). However, effective control methods for empirically
investigating vocal emotional expressions have not yet been
developed, and although some links have been found between
activation (arousal) and parameters such as pitch and intensity,
F0 range, articulation rate etc., no acoustic parameters have been
identified as reliable indicators of key dimensions of emotion such
as valence or approach/avoidance (Mauss and Robinson, 2009).
To address the lack of theoretical foundation, robust algorithmic
implementation of situated social information processing facets is
necessary, and it is likely thatmultiple theoretical perspectives will
need to be considered, ranging from mathematical models and
dynamics of signal exchanges (e.g., emotional states and context
effects), to social intelligence, behavioral analyses, and cognitive
processes such as cooperation (Esposito et al., 2015).
An interesting recent development is an ethological approach to
emotional prosody, which examines commonalities been animal
calls and human emotional prosody (Xu et al., 2013a). The
theoretical framework was first developed in a study of animal
calls (Morton, 1977) and later extended to humans (Ohala, 1984).
It posits a strong selection pressure for organisms to vocally
(just as they do visually) manipulate their apparent body size
when interacting with others. This size-projection hypothesis has
been shown to be capable of explaining a broad range of animal
and human behaviors, as well as bodily anatomies, including the
acoustic characteristics of animal calls (Fitch and Kelley, 2000;
Reby and McComb, 2003; Reby et al., 2005; Harris et al., 2006;
Charlton et al., 2007, 2011), the descent or elongation of the vocal
tract (Fitch, 1999; Fitch and Reby, 2001), and sexually and socially
related human vocal behavior (Feinberg et al., 2005, 2006, 2008;
Bruckert et al., 2006; Riding et al., 2006; Fraccaro et al., 2011;
Xu et al., 2013b). The relevance of this hypothesis for human
emotional prosody has been demonstrated by a series of studies
(Chuenwattanapranithi et al., 2008; Noble and Xu, 2011; Xu et al.,
2013a,b). The consistency of results shown in these studies suggest
that the ethological-based approach is promising and needs to be
further explored in future research.
EVALUATION OF SUCCESS
In this review, we have seen that the ability to synthesize emotional
prosody might, for the most part, be desirable (Drahota et al.,
2008; Robinson and el Kaliouby, 2009). As work continues,
it will be important to understand and properly evaluate our
predispositions to artificial emotional prosody (Robinson and el
Kaliouby, 2009). It is particularly vital to knowwhether these cues
are perceived in the same way as human emotion cues. After all,
the most critical test is to put artificial speech technology into
action and to expose it to the critical comparisonwith social reality
as created by nature (Vogeley and Bente, 2010). To make such
a judgement, we believe that a wide array of assessments will be
required.
At the behavioral level, some literature suggests people may
not be as good at identifying synthesized facial expressions in
avatars as they are at identifying human expressions (Moser
et al., 2007; Rosset et al., 2008), perhaps because many are clearly
not perceptually natural (Douglas-Cowie et al., 2007; Cowie,
2009). However, other studies have shown that recognition of
synthesized facial expressions can sometimes match or even
surpass that of human expressions (Dyck et al., 2008). Whilst
human and artificial voices can be distinguished at the behavioral
level (Nass et al., 2001; Belizaire et al., 2007), a clear main effect
has not been demonstrated when judging intonational emotions.
Another complication comes from the fact that facial studies
report that identification of emotion from artificial faces may
be emotion-dependent, and that recognition is worst for disgust
(Moser et al., 2007; Dyck et al., 2008). The uncanny valley theory
might more generally predict that negative valence emotions
(aversive or warning stimuli) such as anger, fear, sadness and
disgust might attract lower ratings of familiarity and human-
likeness (Tinwell et al., 2011). The validity of such predictions has
never been tested for artificial emotional prosody.
Of particular relevance at the socio-cognitive level, would be
to determine what criteria afford a machine the status of “social
agent” (a software agent or robot capable of social communication
with human beings; Aharoni and Fridlund, 2007). Despite the
knowledge that computerized technology does not warrant social
treatment, people nonetheless tend to apply social expectations
to and exhibit the same responses to computerized technology
as they would to human communication partners (Lee, 2010).
Indeed, there is prior evidence for impression formation from
artificial emotional prosody. For example, its implementation
has been shown to influence social judgments of liking and
credibility from synthesized speech (Nass et al., 2001), and people
tend to present themselves in a more positive light to HCI
agents that emit artificial speech (Parise et al., 1999), although
findings of impression management in response to artificial
speech are not as strong as that in response to human speech
(Lee, 2010; Mitchell et al., 2011). We suggest that the social
influence of HCI-AI agents with artificial emotional prosody
may even extend to stereotypical impression formation. Indeed,
the literature on “Sensitive Artificial Listeners” illustrates that
it is possible for two people to have a conversation in which
one pays little or no attention to the meaning of what the
other says, and chooses emotional interpretations and subsequent
responses on the basis of quite superficial cues(Douglas-Cowie
et al., 2008). Recent data has even shown that participants might
prefer robots with matching gender-occupational role stereotypes
(Tay et al., 2014), and it would be easy enough to test the
hypothesis that emotional prosody makes synthesized speech
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more human-like, and therefore more susceptible to human-like
stereotypes.
In assessing the utility of artificial emotional prosody at
the neural level, the activation of “social cognition” brain
regions is more significant for human stimuli than for artificial
stimuli, as if our brains are “tuned in” to the former (Vogeley
and Bente, 2010). Most pertinent, this is observed when
participants derive emotion cues from facial expressions, in
the amygdala, insula and prefrontal cortex (Mullennix et al.,
2003; Moser et al., 2007; Cheetham et al., 2011; de Borst
and de Gelder, 2015). Thus it could be possible to use the
activation intensity of such brain regions to assess how human-
like an artificial emotion stimulus is (Chaminade and Cheng,
2009). With respect to prosody, researchers should also measure
the activation of regions associated with “voiceness” (degree
to which an auditory stimulus resembles the human voice)
i.e., bilateral upper banks of the superior temporal sulcus
(Belizaire et al., 2007), and those associated with prosodic
emotion recognition, i.e., the right posterior middle/superior
temporal gyri (Mitchell et al., 2003). We would recommend
that the neural response of emotion-specific regions such as
the amygdala for fear (Janak and Tye, 2015), insula for disgust
(Chapman and Anderson, 2012), and superior temporal sulcus
for anger (Carter and Pelphrey, 2008) should also be probed
in evaluating artificial emotional prosody. However, it needs to
be borne in mind that there is no singular means of creating
artificial prosody. Thus each specific means of synthesizing
emotional prosody will have its own imperfections, its own
acoustic correlates, and might invoke its own pattern of neural
response.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Given the importance of emotional prosody in human to human
communication, there is significant potential for interactions
between humans and computerized technology to benefit from
including synthesized emotional prosody in HCI-AI. This need
is only amplified by the pace with which HCI-AI are evolving.
Indeed, to quote Picard “If we want computers to be genuinely
intelligent and to interact naturally with us, we must give
computers the ability to recognize, understand, and even to
have and express emotions” (Picard, 1997). Whilst HCI has
mostly been enhanced by including artificially synthesized facial
expressions, a full multi-level evaluation of our reactions to
synthesized emotional prosody is needed before the wisdom
of its inclusion can be properly evaluated. Further work is
also necessary to determine whether there are circumstances in
which its inclusion does not work well, or whether the problem
lies in how it is synthesized. Achieving human-likeness dialogs
with HCI-AI through explicit computational models might also
provide valuable insights about how humans communicate with
each other (Edlund et al., 2008).
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